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Abstract
We investigate the impacts of spatial pricing for ride-sourcing services in a Stackelberg frame-
work considering traffic congestion. In the lower level, we use combined distribution and assign-
ment approaches to explicitly capture the interactions between drivers’ relocation, riders’ mode
choice, and all travelers’ routing decisions. In the upper level, a monopolistic transportation
network company (TNC) determines spatial pricing strategies to minimize imbalance in a two-
sided markets. We show the existence of the optimal pricing strategies for locational imbalance
minimization, and propose effective algorithms with reliable convergence properties. Further-
more, the optimal pricing is unique, and can be solved in a convex reformulation when matching
time can be ignored. We conduct numerical experiments on different scales of transportation
networks with different TNC objectives to generate policy insights on how spatial pricing could
impact transportation systems.
Keywords: ride-sourcing, transportation network company (TNC), dynamic pricing, traffic
equilibrium, Stakelberg game
1. Introduction
Since the first introduction of UBER services in 2010, ride-sourcing has become an en-
couraging new form of mobility. Transportation network companies (TNCs), also known as
ride-sourcing companies, serve as both platform providers and operators, promising to increase
reliability and efficiency of point-to-point transportation. Dynamic pricing1 is one of TNCs’ key
operational techniques to improve locational supply-demand balance in real-time. Conceptu-
ally, dynamic pricing sets a surge multiplier (SM) for each predefined geographic area, which
∗(Corresponding Author) Assistant Professor, 4353 Scorpius Street, Orlando, Florida 32816-0120, Phone:
407-823-6215, Email: guo@ucf.edu
1E.g., Uber surge pricing, Lyft prime time charges, and Didi Chuxing’s dyanamic pricing.
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dynamically raises (or reduces) the base trip fare when locational demand is higher (or lower)
than available supply until demand and supply are balanced 2. While conceptually appealing,
dynamic pricing receives critiques over the past years due to the opaque of pricing algorithm
and concerns that TNCs may surge unnecessarily high or more frequently to exploit customers
in an oligopolistic setting (Zha et al., 2018a).
Determining optimal pricing strategies may be challenging due to spatio-temporal couplings
and potential conflict of interests between the society and TNCs. On one hand, dynamic pricing
tries to balance supply and demand both in time and in space, but the most research attention
has been paid to the temporal aspect (Bimpikis et al., 2019). Because pricing information
(i.e., SM, base trip fare, etc.) are revealed to both demand and supply markets, which are
interconnected through a transportation network, prices at one location affect services at all
other locations potentially. In practice, TNCs also benefit from using spatial prices to account
for long-term predictable unbalanced demand patterns(Bimpikis et al., 2019). Studying dynamic
pricing from a network perspective is beneficial for both societal welfare and TNCs’ mission.
On the other hand, while TNCs are typically profit-driven, optimal prices for TNCs themselves
may not be optimal for the whole society, which includes riders, drivers and other transportation
users. Better understanding the impact of different TNCs’ objectives on system welfare is critical
to generate planning and regulation insights for policy makers.
In this paper, we focus on addressing the spatial effects of dynamic pricing considering
traffic congestion. We investigate the impacts of spatial pricing 3 for ride-sourcing services in
an interconnected transportation network using a Stackelberg framework. In the lower level,
we explicitly capture the interactions between drivers’ relocation, riders’ mode choice, and all
travelers’ routing decisions. In the upper level, a monopolistic TNC determines spatial pricing
strategies to fulfill its own objective in a two-sided markets. The main contribution of this work
is threefold. First, we explicitly consider the relocation of drivers and transportation conges-
tion, which not only more accurately captures the ride-sourcing behaviors, but also allows for
2In reality, prices for rides are dynamically calculated based on a variety of factors including route, time of
day, ride type, number of available drivers, current demand for rides, and any local fees or surcharges. While
actual pricing algorithm is unknown to public, Chen et al. (2015) reverse engineer the pricing strategies using
high-resolution UBER data.
3Spatial pricing is the average pricing of ride-sourcing services originated from predefined zones, such as census
tracts or 1mi by 1mi blocks. We note that spatial pricing and surge multipliers are closely related. If we ignored
the temporal aspect of surge multipliers, the ratio between spatial pricing and average trip fares in normal states
should be close to surge multipliers.
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systematic analyses of the impacts of spatial pricing on transportation efficiency. Second, while
optimal spatial pricing problems are challenging to solve due to a bi-level structure, we propose
effective computational algorithms, with rigorous analyses on the existence and convergence of
the optimal solutions. Third, when matching time can be ignored, we reformulate the optimal
spatial pricing problem as a single-level convex optimization, which significantly improves the
computational efficiency and guarantees a unique global optimal.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature
on dynamic pricing in ride-sourcing context. Section 3 and section 4 propose the formulations
and algorithms, respectively. We test the models and solution approaches using difference scales
of transportation systems in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper with main research findings
and future research directions.
2. Literature Review
According to SAE international (2018), ride-sourcing is defined as “prearranged and on-
demand transportation services for compensation in which drivers and passengers connect via
digital applications”. This definition includes a broad range of mobility modes. In this paper,
we focus on TNCs for automobiles.
As one of the key operational strategies, ride-sourcing pricing has attracted increasing at-
tention from various research community, including transportation (e.g., (Zha et al., 2018a,b)),
economics (e.g., (Chen and Sheldon, 2016; Bimpikis et al., 2019)), management science (e.g.,
(Guda and Subramanian, 2019)) and computer science (e.g., (Chen et al., 2015)). In addition,
some studies on ride-sourcing modeling are closely related to research on taxi (e.g., (Yang and
Wong, 1998; Lagos, 2000; Yang et al., 2010; Yang and Yang, 2011; He et al., 2018)) and two-sided
marketplace (e.g., Rochet and Tirole (2006); Rysman (2009)). Given an increasingly large body
of literature, we focus on the pricing issues in the context of ride-sourcing from transportation
perspective, with references to other domains as needed.
The impacts of dynamics pricing on ride-sourcing driver supply are still inconclusive. The
first conjecture, denoted as income-target theory, is that drivers quit driving once a daily income
target is reached. This theory is pioneered by Camerer et al. (1997), who find negative wage
elasticity of cabdriver supply in New York City. In contrast, the second conjecture, denoted
as the neoclassical theory(Farber, 2005), suggests that cabdrivers are greedy for higher income,
and cabdrivers supply has a positive wage rate elasticity. Farber (2005) also points out that
the differences between income-target theory and neoclassical theory are in the conception and
3
measurement of the daily wage rate. Chen and Sheldon (2016) provide empirical evidence for
neoclassical theory using high-resolution UBER data. The coexistence of these two competing
theories may explain the empirical evidence that the effect of dynamic pricing on UBER drivers
supply is limited(Chen et al., 2015). Zha et al. (2018a) propose a bi-level modeling framework,
with lower level equilibrium considering both income-target theory and neoclassical theory, and
find that compared to static pricing, surge pricing leads to higher revenue for both the platform
and drivers, but lower customer surplus during highly surged periods. However, the majority
of these studies focus on temporal dimension of dynamic pricing without considering spatial
linkages or driver relocations. In this paper, due to the inconclusive impacts of dynamic pricing
on driver supply, we assume that total driver supply is inelastic to spatial pricing, but drivers
will respond to spatial pricing by choosing their service location.
Another school of literature investigate the potential value of dynamic pricing when market
condition is stochastic(Banerjee et al., 2015; Cachon et al., 2017; Castillo et al., 2017; Taylor,
2018; Gurvich et al., 2019). Banerjee et al. (2015) adopt a queueing-theoretical approach and
find that dynamic pricing only outperform static pricing when TNCs have imperfect knowledge
of system parameters. Although network model is presented, the pricing policies only depend
on number of idle drivers at individual locations. Castillo et al. (2017) consider the problem of
“wild goose chase” when price is set too low, and find that dynamic pricing can avoid this issue
and maintaining prices within a reasonable range. In contrast, in a deterministic setting, Zha
et al. (2018b) adopt a geometric matching framework and find that dynamic pricing may still
set price higher than the societal efficient level. However, idle vehicle relocation behaviors is not
considered in (Zha et al., 2018b).
Bimpikis et al. (2019) are among the first to consider the spatial dimension of ride-sourcing
pricing, by modeling whether and where drivers will join the platform, and where to relocate
themselves when they are idle. Bimpikis et al. (2019) find that spatial pricing contributes to
balance supply and demand, and more balanced demand patterns lead to higher profits and
higher consumer surplus, simultaneously. However, the equilibrium formulation in (Bimpikis
et al., 2019) is indeterminate and the conclusion is, therefore, best seen as an ideal bound(Zha
et al., 2018b). In addition, since Bimpikis et al. (2019) mainly focus on the equilibrium of ride-
sourcing services rather than traffic equilibrium, transportation topology and congestion effects
are ignored. Nie (2017) has indicated the concerns of ride-sourcing services on worsening the
traffic congestion. A more recent working paper by Ban et al. (2018) using general equilibrium
model to formulate the multi-agent interactions in an e-hailing system, has explicitly modeled
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traffic congestion under path independent free-flow travel time assumption. However, pricing
are treated as exogenous parameters and not a focus in (Ban et al., 2018). We aim to fill this
gap by proposing a mathematical tractable modeling framework for spatial pricing considering
traffic equilibrium in a congested transportation network.
3. Methodologies
3.1. Problem Settings and Key Assumptions
We assume that only one TNC serves in our study area, who aims to optimally decide the
spatial prices to minimize demand and supply imbalance. We will consider different objectives
in Section 5 to illustrate the impacts of different TNC objectives on spatial pricing strategies.
Due to the uncoordinated behaviors of a large number of drivers and riders, individual driver
and rider do not have market power, and only respond to the spatial prices set by the TNC.
We assume drivers make their relocation/pickup decisions based on locational attractiveness,
relocation time, waiting time, and locational prices. Locational attractiveness could include
factors such as safety, rider density, easiness of getting returning trips. The modeling framework
is flexible to incorporate more explanatory factors if needed. While drivers have flexibility to
relocate themselves to other locations, travelers are typically not able to change their travel
origin. We assume that the travel demand not requesting TNC services will shift to car driving.
The interactions of drivers, riders, and other passenger vehicles will endogeneously determine the
mobility of the transportation system. Notice that although trips originated from one location
may have different trip distances with different prices, we assume that drivers and travelers
will take the average prices originating from one location into their decision making processes.
This assumption is consistent with the current practice that SMs are based on trip origins only.
Heterogeneous demand, for example, trips with longer travel distance are more sensitive to
spatial prices, can be incorporated into our proposed modeling framework without fundamental
changes on modeling and computational strategies.
In the remaining of this section, we present the mathematical models for two cases: ignoring
and considering matching time. Ignoring matching time, which is significantly easier to solve
(see in Section 4), is appropriate especially when congestion is severe, and drivers and riders
are balanced in one region (therefore waiting time is small compared to relocation/travel time).
In addition, some riders may not be sensitive to waiting time as they can request rides earlier
than their scheduled departure time. We note that ignored matching time is a special case of
considering matching time case.
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3.2. Mathematical Modeling: Ignoring Matching Time
For long-term transportation planning problem with congestion, the relocation time can
significantly exceed the matching time. In this section, we ignore the impacts of matching time
on the behaviors of drivers and riders. This assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.3.
3.2.1. Traffic Modeling
Denote a transportation network by a directed graph G = (N ,A) , where N is the set of
nodes (indexed by n) and A is the set of links (indexed by a). The service area we consider is
a metropolitan area where ride-sourcing demand and supply are aggregated in predefined zones
(e.g., census tracts or 1 mile by 1 mile blocks), represented by nodes. A link may represent a
road section that connects two nodes. Given driver node set R (⊂ N ) and rider node set S
(⊂ N ), drivers will relocate from r (∈ R) to s (∈ S) to pick up riders. Note that the relocation
of drivers could be due to accepted matchings or voluntary relocations. Also note that if a driver
decides to wait at his/her current location, or has accepted trip in the same area, r = s. We
assume that driver relocation decisions following multinomial logistic models, with explanatory
variables of locational attractiveness β0,s, relocation time trs, and locational prices ρs. The
deterministic components of drivers’ utility function are given in (1).
Urs = β0,s − β1trs + β2ρs (1)
where:
Urs : deterministic component of utility measure for a driver going from r to s;
β : utility function parameters (model input);
trs : equilibrium travel time from r to s;
ρs : locational price at s.
While drivers have flexibility to relocate themselves to other locations, we assume riders are
not able to change their travel origins. At each location s (∈ S), we assume a linear ride-sourcing
demand function, as defined in (2). One can adopt more sophisticated demand models, such
as binary logit model in Section 3.3, to describe the ride-sourcing demand as a (decreasing)
function of prices, which will lead to a similar single-level convex reformulation as illustrated in
Section 4.1.
ds = Ds − bsρs (2)
where:
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ds : number of riders requested service at location s;
Ds, bs : coefficients of demand function (model input).
We assume that the total vehicle travel demand, including ride-sourcing travel and passenger
vehicle travel, at location s is given and denoted as D¯s. After been picked up by drivers, ride-
sourcing riders, as well as other passenger vehicles, will travel at routes that minimize their own
travel time. Since trs is endogenously determined by traffic equilibrium, we extend combined
distribution and assignment (CDA) model (Wilson, 1969) to describe the interactions between
drivers’ relocation and the routing of all ride-sourcing vehicles and conventional passenger ve-
hicles. The model is described in (3).
minimize
vˆ,vˇ,q∈IR+
∑
a∈A
∫ va
0
ta(va)du+
1
β1
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
qrs (ln qrs − 1− β2ρs − β0,s) (3a)
subject to
v =
∑
r∈R,s∈S
vˆrs +
∑
s∈S,k∈K
vˇsk, (3b)
(λˆrs) Avˆrs = qrsErs, ∀r, s (3c)
(λˇsk) Avˇsk = d¯skEsk, ∀s, k (3d)
(γr)
∑
s∈S
qrs = Qr, ∀r (3e)
(ηsk) d¯sk = δskD¯s, ∀s, k (3f)
where:
vˆrs, vˇsk : link flow vector (each row corresponds to a link, a) grouped by OD for drivers and
passenger vehicles, respectively;
q : drivers’ relocation flow vector (each row corresponds to an OD, rs);
va : aggregate traffic flow on link a;
ta(·) : travel time function of link a;
A : node-link incidence matrix of network, with 1 at starting node and −1 at ending node;
Ers : O-D incidence vector of O-D pair rs with 1 at origin r, −1 at destination s. If r = s,
Ers = 0;
d¯sk : passenger vehicle traffic flow from s to k;
δsk : ratio of traffic going from s to k to total travel originating from s (model input);
Qr : drivers initial availability at r (model input);
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D¯s : number of vehicles departing from s, including conventional passenger vehicles and
ride-sourcing vehicles (model input);
λˇ, λˆ, γ, η : dual variables of the corresponding constraints.
Constraint (3b) calculates the aggregate link flow va from the link flow associated with
OD pairs rs and sk. Constraints (3c, 3d) are link-based formulations of flow conservation at
each node for each OD pair. Constraint (3e) assumes the total drivers availability Qr at each
location r is inelastic, even though the relocation demand of drivers to each location s is elastic
and depends on the factors described in (1). Constraint (3f) calculates the distribution of riders
and other conventional passenger vehicles OD demand.
In the objective function (3a), the first term corresponds to the total user cost as modeled
in a conventional static traffic equilibrium model (Beckmann et al., 1956), the second term
involving qrs ln qrs corresponds to the entropy of trip distribution, and the remaining terms
correspond to the utility measure of the drivers. This objective function does not have a physical
interpretation, as pointed out by Sheffi (1985), but it guarantees the first Wardrop principle
(Wardrop, 1952) and the multinomial logit location choice assumption being satisfied, as formally
stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1. (combined distribution and assignment for ride-sourcing system) The optimal so-
lutions (vˆ∗, vˇ∗, q∗) of problem (3) are the equilibrium solutions for Wardrop user equilibrium
and the relocation choice of drivers with multinomial logit model (1) given spatial prices ρ.
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.2.2. TNC Behaviors
The pricing decisions of a TNC will influence the equilibrium solutions of (3), which forms
a mathematical programming with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) problem. The objective of
a TNC could be balancing supply and demand, maximizing matches, profits, market shares,
services quality, minimizing total relocation distance, etc. In this paper, we assume that a TNC
would like to minimize the imbalance between supply and demand 4, which has the advantage to
improve driver/rider satisfactory and ultimately leads to a long-term sustainable development.
Comparison between different objectives (minimizing imbalance versus maximizing short-term
4Balancing supply and demand is the goal of dyanmaic pricing claimed by all TNC companies. See, for
example, https://www.ridester.com/training/lessons/surge-primetime-boost-primezones/ (visited on Sep. 26,
2019).
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profits) will be presented in Section 5. The TNC decision making can be modeled as the upper-
level problem, as formulated in (4).
minimize
ρ∈IRS
∑
s∈S
ms (4a)
subject to
ms = |
∑
r∈R
qrs − (Ds − bsρs)|, ∀s (4b)
(3) (4c)
where:
ms : demand-supply imbalance at s.
Obejective (4a) minimizes the total demand-supply imbalance over the study area. Con-
straint (4b) calculates the imbalance as the difference between the number of riders requesting
services Ds − bsρs and the number of drivers arriving at this location
∑
r∈R qrs. While con-
straint (4b) can be reformulated as linear constraints, the bi-level structure still makes the whole
problem challenging to solve to global optimal (Yang and H. Bell, 1998; Gao et al., 2005; Sinha
et al., 2017). In Section 4, we propose an equivalent single-level convex reformulation of (4),
which can be efficiently solved by commercial nonlinear solver (e.g. IPOPT (Wa¨chter, 2009))
or by classic traffic assignment algorithms (e.g. Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Sheffi, 1985) or Evans’
procedure (Evans, 1976)). To investigate the transportation impacts, the spatial pricing models
presented in this paper mainly focus on peak hours, so that we do not explicitly address the
unmatched, if any, riders and drivers in the following time steps. The unserved customers could
keep requesting ride-sourcing services, or switch to other transportation modes, such as driving.
The idle ride-sourcing vehicles will decide whether to stay, relocate, or leave the platform. Their
decisions will determined the drivers initial availability and riders demand function for the next
time step.
3.3. Mathematical Modeling: Considering Matching Time
In this section, we explicitly model the impacts of matching time. Similar to Zha et al. (2016),
we assume the matching rate m has constant elasticity with respect to vacant drivers ND and
waiting riders NR, which leads to a Cobb-Douglas matching function m = α0(ND)
α1(NR)
α2 . In
contrast to (Zha et al., 2016), we do not assume a stationary state, i.e. we assume driver arrival
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rate, rider requesting rate, and matching rate are close but may not be equal during our studied
periods. This relaxation could be helpful as we can see in Section 5 that dynamic pricing does
not guarantee supply-demand balance even in theory.
Denote the locational 5 average and total waiting time for drivers (D) and riders (R) as tD,
TD, tR, and TR, respectively. ∀i ∈ {D,R}, the average waiting time for i can be calculated in
(5), which is explained graphically in Appendix B.
N˙i(t) = fi −m(t) = fi − α0Nα1D (t)Nα2R (t), (5a)
Ti =
∫ T
0
Ni(t)dt, ∀i ∈ {D,R} (5b)
ti =
Ti
fiT
=
∫ T
0
Ni(t)dt
fiT
, (5c)
where fD (fR) is the ride-sourcing supply (demand) flow rate, and T is the study period (e.g.,
peak hour). (5a) is the dynamics of vacant drivers and waiting riders; (5b) and (5c) calculate
the total and average waiting time for drivers and riders over T . While solving (5) analytically
is challenging, ti (∀i ∈ {D,R}) can be solved numerically given fD, fR and boundary conditions
ND(0), NR(0). We then apply linear regression techniques to estimate the relationship between
ti and fi, ∀i ∈ {D,R}, with a function form shown in (6). When α0 = 0.1, α1 = α2 = 0.6, we
have a0 = 6.29, a1 = 2.24, a2 = −2.40 as least square estimators. |a2|> |a1| implies increasing
return of scale for matching rate. The regression summary output (Figure B.10) is presented in
Appendix B.
ti = a0f
a1
i f
a2
−i ∀i ∈ {D,R} (6)
To incorporate matching time in a unified CDA framework, we define an augmented trans-
portation network, G¯ = (N¯ , A¯). The augmenting procedures from G to G¯ is illustrated in Figure
1 using a three-node transportation network, which has one driver node (node 1) and two rider
nodes (node 2 and 3). For each rider node s in Figure 1a, we created s, s′, and s′′, representing
nodes for markets, connectors, riders, respectively, with directed links connecting between them
as shown in Figure 1b. In augmented network G¯, link flow fs′s, fs′′s and fs′′s′ represent the flow
of driver supply, rider demand, and travelers choosing to drive at node s, while the link cost
ts′s and ts′′s are the waiting time for drivers (tD,s) and riders (tR,s), respectively. If travelers
choose to drive, there is no waiting time, so that link cost ts′′s′ = 0.
With an augmented network G¯, the utility function of drivers is identical with (1). Note that
5We omit location index for simplicity.
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(a) Original Network (b) Augmented Network
Figure 1: Illustration of Network Augmentation
trs in (1) will include not only the travel time from r to s
′, trs′ , but also the matching time at s,
ts′s. The drivers relocation and routing behaviors, therefore, can be modeled as (3) (replacing
G with G¯), given riders demand fR and spatial pricing ρ.
For travelers at location s, the ride requesting demand function is not only depends on the
prices ρs, but also depends on the waiting time, ts′′s. We assume that the choice of ride-sourcing
over driving follows a binary logit model, with ride-sourcing utility function as (7),
Us′′s = β
′
0,s − β′1ts′′s − β′2ρs (7)
where β′0,s, β
′
1, β
′
2 are the utility coefficients for ride-sourcing attractiveness, waiting time, and
ride-sourcing prices. We assume driving and ride-sourcing will have the same travel time, there-
fore, travel time will be canceled out and does not need to be included in (7). Since the rider
demand couples with waiting time (see (6) and (7)), the rider behaviors at each location s can
be formulated as a CDA model (8) as well, where the first term corresponds to the conven-
tional Wardrop user equilibrium, and the second term reflects the binomial logit choice between
ride-sourcing and driving.
minimize
fR,s∈IR+
∫ fR,s
0
tR,s(fD,s, u)du+
1
β′1
[
fR,s
(
ln fR,s − 1 + β′2ρs − β′0,s
)
+ (Ds − fR,s) (ln(Ds − fR,s)− 1)
]
(8)
Similar to formulation (4) for ignoring matching time case, the TNC decision making con-
sidering matching time can be modeled as bilevel problem, as shown in (9), where objective (4a)
minimizes total demand-supply imbalance (calculated by (4b)), subject to drivers, riders, and
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all other travelers user equilibrium ((3, replacing G with G¯) and (8)).
minimize
ρ∈IRS
(4a) (9a)
subject to
(4b), (3, replacing G with G¯), (8) (9b)
4. Solution Approach
4.1. Solution Approach: Ignoring Matching Time
We start by showing that when problem (4) is solved to optimal, the ride-sourcing market
will be balanced at each location. In addition, optimal solutions ρ∗ is unique. This is more
formally stated in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. (balancing ride supply and demand) ρ∗ optimizes problem (4) if and only if ride
supply and demand are balanced at each location given ρ∗. In addition, ρ∗ is unique.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 2 says that problem (4) is equivalent to the problem of finding the unique ρ∗ that
balance supply and demand at each location. Notice that ρ can be negative under extreme
scenarios, when too many drivers exist in the system and TNC may provide incentives for riders
to use ride-sourcing services. However, this will not happen in reality given reasonable driver
supply Qr, since drivers will dynamically respond to extreme low prices(Bimpikis et al., 2019).
Leveraging Lemma 2, the optimal spatial prices can be obtained by solving a single-level convex
optimization problem, which will be illustrated in the remaining of this section.
Problem (4) has three types of agents: drivers, riders, and TNC. Because of Lemma 2, the
decision making of TNC can be reformulated as finding ρ∗ such that
∑
r∈R
q∗rs(ρ
∗) = Ds − bsρ∗s,∀s ∈ S (10)
where q∗rs(ρ
∗) is the optimal solutions of (3) given ρ∗. This problem falls within the framework
of multi-agent optimization problem with equilibrium constraints (MOPEC) (Ferris and Wets,
2013), where drivers make relocation decisions; riders decide whether to request ride-sourcing
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services; all travelers make route choices decisions; and the system is subject to equilibrium
conditions (10). MOPEC has been applied in transportation, energy, economics domains, such
as charging infrastructure planning (Guo et al., 2016b), hydro-thermal electricity systems opti-
mization (Philpott et al., 2016), renewable energy supply chain planning (Guo and Fan, 2017),
and computational Walrasian equilibrium (Deride et al., 2019).
Define two types of dummy agents in our problem, Driver and Rider. Given ρ, Driver
solves problem (3), which determines the drivers relocation decision from r to s, qrs(ρ),∀r, s;
and Rider solves problem (11), which determines the riders demand ds(ρ) at each location s.
Note that problem (11) is a constructed unconstrained quadratic programming problem, which
has a closed-form solution d∗s(ρ) = Ds − bsρs,∀s ∈ S, identical to the demand function (2) we
assumed.
maximize
d∈IRS
∑
s∈S
Dsds − bsρsds − 1
2
(ds)
2 (11)
The equilibrium constraints (10) can be reformulated as (12).
∑
r∈R
q∗rs(ρ) = d
∗
s(ρ),∀s ∈ S (12)
Notice that both the objective functions of (3) and (11) consist of terms regarding prices
times quantities, i.e.,
∑
r∈R ρsqrs and ρsds. In addition, notice that the equilibrium constraints
(12) are quantity balance of
∑
r∈R qrs and ds. Inspired by Lagrange multiplier method, we
construct a single-level convex optimization problem (13), which will yield the same spatial
pricing decisions as bilevel formulation, as stated in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. (single-level convex reformulation) ρ solves bi-level problem (4) if and only if ρ
solve single-level problem (13).
Proof. See Appendix A.
minimize
vˆ,vˇ,q,d∈IR+
β1
β2
∑
a∈A
∫ va
0
ta(va)du+
1
β2
∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
qrs (ln qrs − 1− β0,s) +
∑
s∈S
1
bs
(
d2s
2
−Dsds)
(13a)
subject to
(3b ∼ 3f)
(ρs)
∑
r∈R
qrs = ds, ∀s (13b)
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The objective function (13a) is a combination of scaled objective functions (3a) and (11)
without
∑
r∈R ρsqrs and ρsds terms. The purpose of scaling (3a) and (11) is to convert the
units of both objective functions into $ so that they are addable. In addition, the optimal dual
variables ρ∗s of constraints (13b) will unit in $ and balance supply and demand at each location.
Therefore, ρ∗ can be interpreted as spatial prices to solve problem (4) based on Lemma 2.
Problem (13) is a non-linear convex problem, with convex objective function and linear
constraints. So it can be solved to global optimal by commercial nonlinear solver, such as
IPOPT, relatively efficiently. For extreme large-scale problems, this reformulation opens up
opportunities to apply classic and efficient transportation network solution algorithm, such as
Frank-Wolfe algorithm (Sheffi, 1985) and Evans’ procedure (Evans, 1976). In this paper, we focus
on small/medium transportation networks to draw policy insights, and leave the development
of advanced algorithms for large network in the future.
4.2. Solution Approach: Considering Matching Time
Directly solving TNC upper-level problem (9) may be challenging due to highly non-convexity.
We restate (9) as a problem of finding a maxinf-point for an appropriate bivariate function (bi-
function) W (ρ,φ). This conversion is inspired by a recent theoretical development on variational
convergence of bifunction by Jofre´ and Wets (2009), which offers the flexibility of constructing a
bifunction and allows one to choose a sequence of bifunctions with desired properties (including
convexity and continuity) to approximate the original bifunction. A similar approach has been
successfully implemented in (Guo et al., 2016b; Deride et al., 2019). In this paper, we highlight
the key steps of the algorithm design.
We introduce the Walrasian function associated with this equilibrium problem, defined as
W (ρ,ϕ) = −
∑
s∈S
ϕsESs(ρ), on IR
S ×∆S ,
where ∆S corresponds to the S-dimensional unit simplex. ESs is the square of demand-supply
imbalance, defined in (14).
ESs(ρ) =
[∑
r∈R
q∗rs(ρ)− f∗R,s(ρ)
]2
, ∀s ∈ S (14)
where q∗rs and f
∗
R,s are the optimal solutions (as a function of ρ) of problem (3, replacing G with
G¯) and (8), respectively.
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The relationship between maxinf point of W (ρ,ϕ) and the demand-supply balancing (equi-
librium) prices is stated in Lemma 3.
Lemma 3. (equilibrium prices and maxinf-points) For ρ ∈ IRS, ρ is a maxinf-point of the
Walrasian function W such that W (ρ, ·) ≥ 0, on ∆S if and only if ρ is an equilibrium point.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since infϕW (ρ,ϕ) is lack of concavity in ρ, we apply an augmented Lagrangian for this
non-concave formulation. Given sequences of nonegative, nondecreasing scalars {rν}, {Mν},
one can define the sequence of augmented Walrasian functions for this problem as
W ν(ρ,ϕ) = inf
z
{
W (ρ, z) +
1
2rν
|z −ϕ|2
∣∣∣∣ z ∈ ∆S} , on [ρν−1 −Mν ,ρν−1 +Mν ]×∆S (15)
The idea of this procedure is to approximate the problem of finding maxinf-points of the
original Walrasian function W , by computation of approximate maxinf-points ρε (see Definition
1) given by a sequence of augmented Walrasians W ν , which are easier to solve. The convergence
theorem of the proposed approximation scheme is stated in Theorem 2.
Definition 1. (approximating equilibrium point) ρε is an ε-approximating equilibrium point,
denoted as ε−argmaxinf W , for ε ≥ 0, if the following inequality holds: |inf W (ρε, ·)− supinf W | ≤
ε.
Theorem 2. (convergence of approximating maxinf-points) Suppose that supinf W is finite.
Consider non-negative sequences {rν}, {Mν}, and {εν} such that rν↗∞, Mν↗∞, εν↘0. Let
{W ν} be a family of augmented Walrasian functions associated with each parameters rν and Mν .
Let ρν ∈ εν − argmaxinf W ν , and ρ∗ be any cluster point of {ρν}. Then ρ∗ ∈ argmaxinf W .
Proof. See (Guo et al., 2016b).
Following Theorem 2, we propose the computational algorithm, as summarized in Algorithm
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1, to achieve a sequence of approximating maxinf-points.
Result: ρν
initialization: ν = 0, ε0, M0, r0, gap0, ρ0, , 0 < c1 < 1, c2 > 1;
while gapν ≥  do
Phase I: solve the minimization problem ϕν+1 ∈ argminW ν+1(ρν , ·);
Phase II: solve the maximization problem ρν+1 ∈ argmaxW ν+1(·,ϕν+1);
evaluate: ESs(ρ
ν+1), s ∈ S ;
let: gapν+1 = max{ESs(ρν+1), s ∈ S};
let: εν+1 = c1ε
ν , Mν+1 = c2M
ν , rν+1 = c2r
ν ;
let: ν := ν + 1
end
Algorithm 1: Approximating Maxinf-Point Algorithm
Phase I consists of the minimization of a quadratic objective function over the S-dimensional
simplex. This can be solved using Cplex/Gurobi solver. Phase II is done without considering
first order information (due to a lack of concavity) and relying on BOBYQA algorithm (Powell,
2009), which performs a sequentially local quadratic fit of the objective functions, over box
constraints, and solves it using a trust-region method. As rν↗∞, and Mν↗∞, and εν↘0, in
virtue of Theorem 2, ρν → ρ∗, a maxinf-point of W .
Remarks:
1. The network augmenting procedures proposed in Section 3.3 result in a transportation
network with non-separable link-cost function (i.e., tD and tR), and the Jacobian of link-cost
function is asymmetric, for which there is no known mathematical program whose solutions
are the equilibrium flow pattern (Sheffi, 1985). But, the traffic equilibrium solutions can be
achieved by diagonalization method (Sheffi, 1985). We note that since the Jocobian of the
link-cost functions is not positive definite when |a1| ≤ |a2| and fD,s ≈ fR,s, the convergence
of traffic equilibrium is not guaranteed in theory, although the algorithm may still convergence
when this condition is violated (Fisk and Nguyen, 1982). To make our algorithm robust to non-
convergence of traffic equilibrium, the algorithm we develop here does not require convergence
for every iteration.
2. Notice that problem (9) has at least |S| trivial equilibrium solutions, where only one
location s attracts all the drivers
∑
r∈RQr. This is because when driver supply approaches 0
and price is finite at one location, rider demand will also approach 0 due to infinite waiting time,
and vice versa. The insight from this is that ride-sourcing market may need a critical mass of
drivers and riders to sustain. In this paper, we only focus on non-trivial equilibrium.
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5. Numerical Examples
In this section, we test our models and solution approaches on a three-node system (Figure
2) and Sioux Falls network (Figure 6). We implement our model on Pyomo 5.6.6 (Hart et al.,
2017). We solve the problems using IPOPT 3.12.13 (Wa¨chter, 2009) for ignoring matching time
case, and Cplex 12.8 & BOBYQA (in NLopt 2.4.2) for considering matching time case, both
with 0.1% optimality gap. All the numerical experiments presented in this section were run
on a 3.5 GHz Intel Core i5 processor with 8 GB of RAM memory, under Mac OS X operating
system.
5.1. Three-node Network
The three-node test instance (Figure 2) has one driver node (node 1) and two demand nodes
(node 2 and 3). 50 drivers decide where to pick up riders at node 1. β0 = 0, β1 = 1, β2 = 0.6.
The link travel time has a form of ta = t
0
a[1 + 0.15 ∗ (va/ca)2], where t0a is the free flow travel
time and ca is the link capacity parameter. The value of t
0
a and ca for each link are shown in
Figure 2. Notice that this test instance is symmetric except that links between node 1 and 3
have lower capacity. Through out Section 5, background traffic is not considered.
Figure 2: Three Nodes Test Network
5.1.1. Ignoring Matching Time
We assume both node 2 and 3 have a demand function of ds = 300 − 5ρs. Solving this
problem using our single-level reformuation (13), we have ρ2 = 53.5, ρ3 = 56.5. Notice that with
these locational prices, the demand market at both node 2 and 3 are balanced. The difference
between ρ2 and ρ3 is because of the link congestion between node 1 and 3. In other words, node
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3 is more congested to travel to due to limited link capacity, so that to attract more drivers
to pick up riders at node 3, TNC needs to offer a higher locational price. If TNC doesn’t
consider transportation congestion, the optimal locational prices are ρ′2 = ρ
′
3 = 55.0, which
will lead to unbalance of supply and demand on both demand nodes in reality. These optimal
solutions are validated by applying global solver SCIP (Achterberg, 2009) directly on mixed-
integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) reformulation of bi-level problem (4). Reformulating
bi-level problem into MINLP is standard, so we omit the detail procedures for conciseness.
For three-node example, our reformulation (13) can be solved by IPOPT in 0.1 seconds, while
MINLP formulation takes SCIP 5.6 seconds to solve. Although both SCIP and IPOPT solve the
problem for global optimal, MINLP formulation is sensitive to the selection of big-M parameters,
which is a challenging issue for mixed integer programming with switching constraints (Guo
et al., 2016a).
Because TNC aims to balance supply and demand, transportation congestion can be worse
under spatial pricing. We compare between two scenarios, surge pricing and uniform pricing.
If we change from uniform pricing to surge pricing, the total travel time increases slightly from
1333 to 1336. The increase of total travel time is because TNC gives incentive (surge pricing)
to drivers traveling through congested area in order to balance demand. This result matches
the empirical findings in (Nie, 2017) that ride-sourcing may increase transportation congestion
compared to taxi services. Regulations will be needed to prevent pricing selfishly by TNCs to
improve overall transportation mobility, especially in congested area.
Next, we compare the impacts of TNC’s objectives between maximizing profits and mini-
mizing imbalance. The problem of maximizing profits is shown in (16).
maximize
ρ∈IRS
∑
s∈S
ρsns (16a)
subject to
ns = min(
∑
r∈R
qrs, Ds − bsρs), ∀s (16b)
(3) (16c)
where:
ns : ride-sourcing matches at s.
(16a) maximizes total revenues. Since the majority of TNC operating costs go to sales,
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marketing, administrative, and R&D 6, we assume that operational costs for TNC is independent
of spatial pricing and drivers/riders flow, so the optimal pricing maximizes total revenues will
also maximize total profits in the service territory. But we note that operating costs can be
easily incorporated in (16a) if operating costs data is available. (16b) calculates the matches at
each location s. For problem (16), we are not able to directly make the single-level reformulation
as in (13). So we solve the bilevel problem (16) as MINLP using SCIP solver. The numerical
results are shown in Figure 3a and Figure 3b , in which we conduct sensitivity analyses of the
total number of drivers and interception of demand function on equilibrium prices with different
TNC’s objectives. When TNC aims to minimize imbalance for each location, the optimal prices
are almost linearly decreasing (increasing) with increasing of supply (demand) for this toy test
instance. The trend of optimal prices are slightly more complex when TNC aims to maximize
profits. When supply is relatively high or demand is relatively low, TNC’s profits are not
restricted by drivers availability, so that TNC will set prices converge to monopoly prices, which
are Ds/2bs,∀s. This means that when TNCs aim to maximize profits, the supply and demand
may not necessarily balanced at each location. This finding is consistent with the results in
(Bimpikis et al., 2019) where endogenously determined spatial prices aiming to maximize profits
may not always balance supply and demand. Notice that when demand is comparable to supply,
prices minimizing imbalance of ride requests are identical with prices maximizing TNC profits,
which indicates that maximizing balance of supply and demand leads to maximum profits for
TNC.
5.1.2. Considering Matching Time
When matching time cannot be ignored for both drivers’ and riders’ decision making, we can
solve problem (9) using Algorithm 1. We assume Ds = 300, ∀s. The riders’ utility coefficients
β′0 = 0, β
′
1 = 1, β
′
2 = 0.6.
With different initial locational prices, the convergence pattern of prices and ES are shown in
Figure 4. The average computation time is 27.8s, and all of the experiments converged efficiently
to the same equilibrium solutions, ρ∗2 = 37.4, ρ
∗
3 = 38.0, f
∗
D,2 = f
∗
R,2 = 33.1, f
∗
D,3 = f
∗
R,3 = 16.9.
Notice that TNC offers a slightly higher price at location 3, which is more congested to travel
to. This observation is consistent with the observation in ignoring matching time case.
We note that ignoring matching time is a special case of considering matching time when
a0 = 0 in (6). We compare the equilibrium solutions between ignoring and considering matching
6https://news.crunchbase.com/news/understanding-uber-loses-money/
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Figure 3: Impacts of Supply and Demand on Optimal Surge Pricing
time cases, with the results of equilibrium spatial pricing, driver supply and rider demand shown
in Figure 5. We can see that, compared to equilibrium prices, driver and rider flows are less
sensitive to whether matching time is considered or not. The reason is that different locations,
when supply and demand are balanced, have similar waiting time. For drivers, their relocation
choices only depend on the utility difference between locations, which will not change if similar
waiting time is ignored. Therefore, driver supply remain unchanged (see Figure 5a). Given
similar amount of driver supply, TNC will need to raise up locational prices (see Figure 5c)
to compensate the ignored waiting time, so that rider demand still balance driver supply (see
Figure 5b).
5.2. Sioux Falls Network
We implement our model using a medium-size test system, Sioux Falls network7, as shown
in Figure 6. In Figure 6, the red and blue nodes (12 of each) represent the original locations
of drivers and riders, respectively. Drivers supply at each red node is 50, while the demand
function at each blue node is ds = 300 − 5ρs. We adopt a 4th-order Bureau of Public Roads
7Sioux Falls network consists of 24 nodes and 76 directed links. The number on each node/link in Figure 6
is the node/link index. Figure 6 is edited base on a map provided by Hai Yang and Meng Qiang, Hong Kong
University of Science and Technology.
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(BPR) function for link cost: ta = t
0
a[1+0.15∗ (va/ca)4]. Coefficients of utility function for base
case (1) are β0 = 0, β1 = 1, β2 = 0.6.
Figure 6: Sioux Falls Test Network
5.2.1. Ignoring Matching Time
The optimal locational pricing decisions and total equilibrium travel time are shown in Figure
7. With price sensitivity coefficient β2 increase from 0.1 to 10, the price variances decrease (see
Figure 7a). This is because when drivers are more sensitive to prices, TNC needs smaller price
difference to attract drivers to the desired locations. At the same time, drivers are more willing
to travel longer distance in order to reach a location with higher price. This will lead to higher
system total travel time, as shown in Figure 7b.
SCIP is not able to solve the MINLP reformulation of problem (4) for Sioux Falls network,
while IPOPT can efficiently solve (13) in 11.3, 6.1, and 4.9 seconds for b2 = 0.1, 1, and 10,
respectively.
5.2.2. Considering Matching Time
Considering matching time, the problem can be solved by Algorithm 1 in 6.4 hours, which is
significantly longer than the computation time for ignoring matching time case. This is because
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Figure 7: Impacts of Supply and Demand on Optimal Surge Pricing
of the lack of convexity for both upper and lower problems in (9). But the algorithm converge
reliably in 12 iterations, with convergence patterns of ES and ρ shown in Figure 8.
Comparing between the impact of spatial pricing on transportation congestion, the total
travel cost is 3805.5 when spatial pricing is adopted. When TNC adopts uniform pricing, the
total travel cost is 3770.4. This observation is again consistent with the results in ignoring
matching time case.
6. Discussion
In this paper, we have presented a new modeling framework and effective computational
techniques for ride-sourcing spatial pricing problems, considering leader-follower structure of
TNCs, riders, and drivers. In the lower level, interactions between drivers relocation, riders’
mode choice, all travelers’ routing behaviors, and network congestion are explicitly modeled.
In the upper level, a monopoly TNC optimally determines spatial prices to achieve its own
objectives. When matching time can be ignored, we show that the problem is equivalent to a
convex optimization problem, which can be efficiently solved to global optimal by commercial
nonlinear solver, such as IPOPT. Existence and uniqueness of optimal solutions are proved.
When matching time cannot be ignored, we show that the lower-level drivers’ and riders’ two-
sided interaction can be reformulated in a unified CDA framework with non-separable link-cost
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Figure 8: Convergence of ES and ρ Considering Matching Time
function through network augmentation. The problem can be solved reliably by approximating
maxinf-points algorithm.
In addition to showing the effectiveness of our solution approaches, we demonstrated that
(1) transportation congestion affects spatial pricing strategies, and spatial pricing strategies
may aggravate transportation congestion compared to uniform pricing; (2) the spatial pricing
strategies minimizing supply-demand imbalance also maximize TNC profits when maximum
demand and supply are comparable; (3) drivers’ preference will significantly impact spatial
prices and transportation congestion; and (4) the impacts of waiting time may be small for the
distribution of drivers and riders, but may be large for the scale of spatial pricing.
This research can be extended in several directions. From a methodological viewpoint, our
model mainly focuses on spatial aspects. Coupling temporal and spatial dimensions are critical
to fully understand the impacts of dynamic pricing on transportation systems. In addition,
several assumptions in this study can be relaxed. For example, the assumption on monopoly
competition and inelastic total driver supply could be relaxed to generalize our findings. After
gaining a clear understanding about the impacts of saptial pricing on transportation systems,
strategies to mitigate the negative impacts from regulators perspective is urgently needed. Ex-
tending our model to a stochastic environment is another immediate next step considering the
high level of uncertainties involved in ride-sourcing market, including congestion, rider demand,
driver supply, etc. Although our model can be efficiently solved for small and medium trans-
portation networks, algorithm development is needed for extreme large cases. Classic traffic
assignment algorithm could be leveraged to solve the lower-level problem more efficiently. Solv-
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ing a stochastic version of our model might also present further numerical challenges, for which
decomposition methods (such as scenario decomposition and Benders decomposition) developed
for stochastic programs may be integrated with the reformulation techniques in this study.
From a pratical perspective, given the challenges of obtaining ride-sourcing data, agent-based
simulation techniques can be leveraged to simulate the ride-sourcing environment and generate
simulated data for implementation, validation and numerical insights.
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Appendix A. Proofs.
Proof (Lemma 1). The proof of Lemma 1 is outlined as follows. Since (3a) is strictly con-
vex (assuming ta(·) is a strictly monotone increasing function) and constraints of model (3)
are linear, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are the sufficient and necessary optimality
conditions. One can show that the KKT conditions are equivalent to the Wardrop equilibrium
conditions (i.e., travel time in all routes actually used are equal and less than those that would
be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route) and logit model solutions. For details,
please refer to (Evans, 1976).
Proof (Lemma 2). Denote the optimized drivers distribution of model (3) as q∗rs. Because of
constraint (3e), the total drivers supply is:∑
r∈R
∑
s∈S
q∗rs =
∑
r∈R
Qr
.
= Q¯,
which is a constant.
Because of constraint (4b), ms ≤
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs. Therefore,
∑
s∈S ms ≤
∑
s∈S
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs = Q¯.
Denote the optimal value of ms as m
∗
s, we have:∑
s∈S
m∗s ≤ Q¯ (A.1)
On the other hand, ∑
s∈S
m∗s ≥ 0 (A.2)
The equality in (A.2) holds if and only if∑
r∈R
q∗rs = Ds − bsρs,∀s ∈ S (A.3)
In other words, we just need to show that ∃ρ ∈ IRS , s.t. (A.3) holds.
Define excess supply ESs(ρ) =
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs(ρ)− (Ds− bsρs),∀s. For each location s, the ride-
sourcing supply
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs(ρ) ≤ Q¯; the equality holds when all the drivers relocate to location s.
Therefore, the minimum locational price ρs = (Ds − Q¯)/bs. On the other hand, the minimum
ride-sourcing supply is strictly positive. Therefore, the maximum locational price ρ¯s = Ds/bs.
This implies that ρs ∈ [ρs, ρ¯s],∀s.
Define a convex compact set H = Πs∈S [ρs, ρs]. Next, we construt a function ρ
′ = h(ρ) =
(hs(ρs),∀s), such that:
ρ′s = hs(ρs) = ρs −
(ρs − ρs)ESs(ρ)
Q¯
= ρs − ESs(ρ)
bs
, ρs ∈ [ρs, ρs]
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We would like to show that ρ′s ∈ [ρs, ρs]. Firstly, it can be easily seen that hk(ρs) =
ρ
s
− ESs(ρ)bs = ρs −
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs(ρ)−(Ds−bsρs)
bs
≤ Ds−Q¯bs −
0−Q¯
bs
= ρs, and hk(ρs) = ρs − ESs(ρ)bs =
ρs −
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs(ρ)−(Ds−bsρs)
bs
≥ Dsbs −
(Q−0)
bs
= ρ
s
. Secondly, we only need to show hs(ρs) is
a monotone decreasing function. To show that, we take first order derivative of hs(ρs) with
respect to ρs:
h˙s(ρs) = 1− 1
bs
∂ESs(ρ)
∂ρs
= 1− 1
bs
(
∂
∑
r∈R q
∗
rs(ρ)
∂ρs
− ∂(Ds − bsρs)
∂ρs
)
Because
∂
∑
r∈R q
rs∗(ρ)
∂ρs ≥ 0,
h˙s(ρ
s) ≤ 1− 1
bs
(0 + bs) = 0
Therefore, we have proved function h(·) is a mapping from H to H. In addition, because
h(·) is monotone and continuous; and H is a convex compact subset of Euclidean space, based
on Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, there exists ρ∗ ∈ H, such that ρ∗ = h(ρ∗). Therefore, for
any s, ρ∗s = ρ
∗
s − ESs(ρ
∗)
bs , which leads to ESs(ρ
∗) = 0,∀s.
To show the uniqueness of ρ∗, assuming that there exist ρ∗∗ such that ESs(ρ∗∗) = 0,∀s.
Therefore, h(ρ∗∗) = ρ∗∗, i.e., ρ∗∗ is another fixed point of ρ′ = h(ρ). Without lost of generality,
assuming ρ∗∗s > ρ
∗
s. Since hs(·) is monotone decreasing, ρ∗∗s = hs(ρ∗∗s ) ≤ hs(ρ∗s) = ρ∗s, which is
a contraction with the assumption that ρ∗∗s > ρ
∗
s.
Proof (Theorem 1). Because problem (13), (3) and (11) are convex optimization, KKT con-
ditions are both necessary and sufficient conditions. It can be shown that the KKT conditions
of problem (13) are identical to the KKT conditions of problem (3), (11) and equilibirum con-
straint (12). Therefore, ρ∗ that solves problem (13) also soves MOPEC problem (3), (11) and
(12). Based on Lemma 2, ρ∗ solves original problem (4).
Proof (Lemma 3). On one hand, if ρ∗ is a maxinf-point of the Walrasian with W (ρ∗, ·) ≥ 0,
it follows that for all unit vectors es = (0, . . . , 1, . . .), the s-th entry is 1, W (ρ∗, es) ≥ 0 which
implies ESs(ρ
∗) = 0. On the other hand, if ρ∗ is an equilibrium prices, i.e. ESs(ρ∗) = 0, it
follows that W (ρ∗, ·) = 0. Because W (ρ, ·) ≤ 0 for any ρ, ρ∗ is a maxinf point of the Walrasian.
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Appendix B. Matching Time ∼ Driver and Rider Flow
Equation (5) can be better explained graphically in Figure B.9. Line 1 and 2 indicates
the accumulative drivers (slope f1) and riders (slope f2) arrival curves, respectively. Line 3
represents the accumulative matching (with slope m calculated from Cobb-Douglas matching
function). The area of the shadow areas indicate the total delay of drivers (or riders) till time
period T , from which, the average delay per driver (t1) and per rider (t2) can be calculated.
By varying f1 and f2, we are able to calculate t1 and t2 numerically, which will be used for
estimating parameters in (6).
Figure B.9: Graphical Representation of Matching Time
Figure B.10: Regression Summary Output of (6)
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